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ABSTRACT
Copyright law is not distinctively designed for redistribution. And yet,
numerous fairness scholars and other critics of the economics paradigm
claim that copyright law should be based upon redistribution, rather than
efficiency. Redistributive justice goals intrinsically play a role in the
design of the copyright commons, but whether copyright law should itself
serve as the means of achieving such goals is truly questionable.
This Article argues instead that, subject to narrow exceptions, copyright
law doctrine should not promote redistributive justice concerns and that
other, more efficient areas of law such as taxation and welfare programs
should do so. This argument accords with the prevailing welfare
economics approach to copyright jurisprudence and emphasizes the latest
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing litigation.
This Article focuses on the leading classes of individuals subject to the
distributive injustice that has emerged on the internet: poor infringers,
poor creators and wealthy copyright holders. This Article argues that, for
at least these three classes of individuals, redistribution through copyright
law offers no efficiency advantage over redistribution through the income
tax system and other legal transfer mechanisms.
Assistant Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. This Article was prepared
during an Internet Society Project (ISP) visiting Fellowship at the Yale Law School. It
was also presented at the Law and Technology Workshop Seminar at the Hebrew
University, Jerusalem. For their support and advice I wish to thank Mark Lemley, Guy
Pessach, Michael Birnhack, Tal Zarsky, Uri Benoliel and the workshop's participants.
After June 1, 2006, this Article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0
License, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/. Any inaccuracies are my
responsibility.
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Copyright law, like so many normative theories concerning social
arrangements, seems to have bent into the dialectics of egalitarianism.'
Copyright law is often perceived as a social arrangement, but it is
primarily concerned with governing the processes of creation and
invention and not simply the proprietary legal entitlements it bestows.
However, copyright jurisprudence may have reached a point where it can
no longer be said to merely preserve freedom of speech,2 maintain the
public sphere, 3 protect subsequent generations of authors, 4 promote liberty
and freedom.5 Instead, it now is said to support direct distributive justice
ends through what is considered a fair distribution of proprietary legal
entitlements.
Within copyright jurisprudence, distributive justice functions as a
normative claim about the fair allocation of proprietary entitlements
among original copyright owners and other individuals in society.6 An
1 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the
Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW 121, 121-66 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006)
(describing the relationship between the copyright holder and the public in copyright law
as a social phenomenon manifested through creative practice, as distinguished from the
allocation of legal entitlements); Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity
and the Construction of Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 864
(2007) ("Distributive justice must be considered").
2 See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Eugene Volokh & Brett
McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases,
107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2445 (1998).
3 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 18-20 (1996); Yochai Benkler, Free As
the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 360-64 (1999); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, Justice Between Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 287
(2002) (arguing that the rights of each generation of authors, including the rights that they
might attempt to assert through private ordering measures, be limited for the benefit of
subsequent generations of authors).
5 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 27-28 (2001); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy of 'Rights Management,' 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 481-95
(1998).
6 Louis KAPLOW & STEPHEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 121 (2002); John E.
ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1-2 (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow, Distributive
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examination of the academic literature and copyright litigation reveals that
distributive justice arguments are appearing with greater frequency and
receiving greater deference in copyright jurisprudence. When faced with
this expansion of the importance of distributive justice in copyright
doctrine, one is reminded of Will Kymlicka's fatalistic chronicle of how,
under the burden of time, this becomes the fate of all too many
contemporary political theories. 7 This Article argues against the prospect
of increasing deference to distributive justice in copyright law.
Distributive justice arguments appear most prominently in litigation
involving copyright holders, such as motion picture studios, recording
companies, songwriters, music publishers and even venture capitalists.
8
These copyright holders are accused of trying to maximize their own
profits, or even efficiency at large, at the expense of disadvantaged users,
creators and amateurs. In recent copyright file-sharing litigation, those
who have defended distributive concerns, or sought to extend copyright
protection, have often bemoaned the alleged decline in profits that record
companies have suffered-and that Hollywood may face-thereby
advancing distributive justice arguments.' 0 Like other social theories
Justice and Desirable Ends of Economic Activity, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY
MACROECONOMICS AND DISTRIBUTION 134, 135 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1985); Russell
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be Gained by
Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REv. 329, 332 (1998) (distinguishing
between distributive justice and efficiency).
7 See WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 53-
96 (2d ed. 2002); see also AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 12 (1992)
("[E]very normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time
seems to demand equality of something.").
8 See Brief of the National Venture Capital Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, 2005 WL 497759, at *17 & n.14, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 1605 (2005) (No. 04-480) ("[T]he indeterminate reach of such
secondary liability means that not merely start-up capital is at risk, but also the personal
wealth of start-up's officers, directors, and investors.").
9 See, e.g., Recording Industry to Begin Collecting Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits
Against File 'Sharers' Who Illegally OQffer Music Online, RIAA PRESS ROOM, June 25,
2003, http://www.riaa.com/ (quoting Recording Industry Association of America
President Cary Sherman as saying, "We cannot stand by while piracy takes a devastating
toll on artists, musicians, songwriters, retailers and everyone in the music industry.").
For evidence that services like Napster have in fact hurt record company profits, see Stan
Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence so Far
(June 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-414162 (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
10 See, e.g., Ronald Grover & Heather Green, Hollywood Heist: Will Tinseltown Let
Techies Steal the Show?, Bus. WK., July 14, 2003, at 74, 76 (reporting that Hollywood
executives are concerned that the movie industry may suffer the same loss of profits
suffered by the music industry). The RIAA has admitted regarding its lawsuits against
music downloaders, including minors, that, "[w]hen you fish with a net, you sometimes
are going to catch a few dolphin." Dennis Roddy, The Song Remains the Same,
2007-2008
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advancing equality concerns, distributive justice arguments seem to have
gained jurisprudential imprimatur in copyright law despite the tension of
such arguments with the existing copyright jurisprudence goal of
economic efficiency. I
The economic efficiency paradigm of copyright law is challenged by
numerous fairness scholars and other critics. These scholars and critics
emphasize the importance of distributive justice within copyright
jurisprudence. They are concerned with the distribution of funding,
subsidies and other financial gains copyright may allocate to less
deserving creators at the expense of original copyright owners. 12 They
argue that intellectual property law, and, more specifically, copyright law,
should emphasize fair distribution over efficiency. This distributive justice
conception of copyright has given rise to a plethora of side arguments: that
copyright law is remarkably similar to tax law, as intellectual property
monopoly is, in effect, a negative tax intended to reward innovation; 13 that
copyright law should be analogized to corporate welfare 14 or social
welfare; 15 or that the constitutional "encouragement" theory should be
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 14, 2003, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/columnists/20030914edroddy0914pl.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
" Cf Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need. The Welfare State and Theories of
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV 877 (1976) (discussing different takes of
distributive justice within private law).
12 See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, supra note 1; Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; or,
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
453, 481, 482 (2002) (concerned with enabling content creation by poor creators); Molly
Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1539-
1540, 1562-1564 (2005) (concerned with the distributive effects of copyright law as they
relate to poor creators). For less precise usage of copyright distributive arguments, see
Tom W. Bell, Author's Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism.for Redistributing
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 229 (2003) [hereinafter Bell, Author's Welfare]; Tom W.
Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in CoPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 6-7 (Adam Thierer & Clyde
Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing] (analogizing
welfare laws to copyright law to argue that extensive copyright protections are unfair and
inefficient); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-To-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 951, 953-54 (2004) (discussing a concern for amateur and poor creators in the
"marketplace of ideas").
13 See, e.g., Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership, supra note 12, at 482.
14 See Bell, Author's Welfare, supra note 12, at 229; Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing, supra
note 12, at 6-7.
15 See Bell, Author's Welfare, supra note 12, at 229; Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing, supra
note 12, at 6-7.
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applied to copyright. 16 There are additional indirect takes on copyright
distributive justice primarily within academic writings, notably within the
work of Shaffer Von Houweling, 17 Ghosh 8 and Bell. 19 Such scholars
assert that the distribution of wealth generated by limited creativity may
be more important to public policy than encouraging efficiency 20 or
cultural well-being. 21 Recently, this fairness analysis has begun appearing
in areas of copyright jurisprudence including the fair use doctrine, 22 the
extension terms analysis,23 the substantial non-infringing use test for
secondary liability, 24 and even in the application of antitrust laws to
16 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1414 (1989)
(referencing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
1 Von Houweling, supra note 12, at 31-34.
8 Ghosh, supra note 13, at 475-82.
19 Bell, Author's Welfare, supra note 12, at 229, 231; Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing, supra
note 12, at 6-7; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223-26 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). But see, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961, 994 n.65 (2001); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 613 (1982) (stating that inefficiencies
from compulsory terms and from redistribution through taxation "involve exactly the
same kinds of waste," leaving a difficult empirical question as to which is preferable);
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 508
(1980) (arguing that, because taxation as well as contractual regulation has efficiency
costs, determining the preferable means of redistribution raises an empirical question that
"must be resolved on a case-by-case basis").
20 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in
Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 854 (2004).
21 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2003); see discussion infra Part B.3.
22 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use limitations on exclusive rights to copyright); see, e.g.,
Ghosh, supra note 1, at 882-883; Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 387, 485-86 (2003); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628-30 (1982) (arguing that because the costs of contracting
and of verifying end-users' income may prevent copyright owners from giving price
breaks to low income consumers, such costs are a type of market failure).
23 See Joseph A. Lavigne, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer Via the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311, 351 (1996)
(criticizing the Copyright Extension Act 1996 on distributive justice grounds for
disfavoring wealthy artists).
24 Ghosh, supra note 1, at 884-85 ("The doctrine of secondary liability attempts to
accommodate the creation of new technologies that may undermine the economic return
of existing technology and intellectual property holders. The task of balancing the old
2007-2008
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copyright law.25 With regard to copyrighted material on the internet, critics
have recently claimed that copyright law should serve the purpose of
transferring segments of proprietary legal entitlements from artists and
distributors to the public at large. 26 As will be described herein, work in
legal academia already addresses the possibility of redistribution through
copyright law, rather than by progressive taxation,27 welfare law,28 transfer
payments such as regulation of broadcasters and telecommunications
companies to increase access in poor neighborhoods, 29  or even
employment opportunity programs though labor law.30 Likewise, although
the Supreme Court's analyses continue to emphasize the provision of
economic incentives to produce new works, an "author's rights," or
fairness-based strain of analysis has also emerged, such as in Harper &
with the new necessarily requires consideration of how to divide resources between two
competing groups.").
25 Id. at 886-88 (arguing that antitrust law and intellectual property share the common
goals of distributive justice by ensuring the proper distribution of resources among
creators, between creators and users, and across generations).
26 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 305 (2002); Ghosh,
supra note 12, at 481-82; see also discussion infra Part B.3.
2' But see Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for
Equality: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000) (arguing that legal rules
should redistribute to the less well-off even if there is a redistributional tax system in
place). In the context of contract law, see the seminal work of Anthony T. Kronman,
supra note 19, at 475. It is important to distinguish between contractually-based
redistribution like that referred to by Kronman, and disputes between unfamiliar persons,
where parties are, in effect, strangers prior to the dispute. The victims in such cases are
third parties.
2' For an example of welfare legislation, see Aid for Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), a program effectively abolished by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Other programs
falling within the scope of "social welfare" and "welfare" as used herein include those
created by the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-36 (2006) (creating a program to
improve diets of members of low-income households).
29 Economists have long considered government expenditures together with taxation,
recognizing government transfer payments as both increased income for the individuals
receiving them and also negative taxes from a fiscal perspective. See RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE 1N THEORY AND PRACTICE 216,
295 (5th ed. 1989).
30 See, e.g., MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION (1990);
WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1972); James A. Mirrlees, An
Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175
(1971).
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Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,3 1 or more recently in Justice
Souter's famous Grokster file-sharing opinion.
32
When referring to copyright distributive justice herein, one must
distinguish between distribution among creators, which is non-rivalrous
and stands outside the scope of the real property/intellectual property
comparison, and distribution among a given creator and his or her product
end-users, which is rivalrous in a manner similar to real property. Between
creators and product end-users, the key issue is the allocation and
distribution of final created products. Simply put, in the intellectual
property commons, the distributional conflict between creators and users
is similar to that between suppliers and demanders of resources in other
arenas.
33
Traditionally, copyright law was not seen as a vehicle for
promoting distributive justice or "individual well being."3 4 Instead,
copyright in the United States originated from the concept of economic
efficiency and has been largely interpreted as a device for maximizing
social utility.35 Three major economic approaches compete to define
economic efficiency within copyright jurisprudence. The first approach,
known as the "incentive theory," has been articulated by Landes and
Posner as the maximization of incentives for creativity combined with the
minimization of monopoly losses. 36 According to the incentive theory, the
3 471 U.S. 539, 539-49 (1985). The Supreme Court, using a fairness-based analysis,
found that there was no fair use of excerpts taken from President Ford's memoirs prior to
their publication.
32 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2776 & n.8 (U.S. 2005)
(referencing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223-26 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting));
Brief for Sovereign Artists et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Grokster,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480); Van Houweling, supra note 12. Grokster, Sovereign
Artists' Brief, and Van Houweling all support a fairness approach to distributive justice
while arguing for the widespread distribution of creative works.
33 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 46-53 (1996); Jean-
Pascal Benassy, On Competitive Market Mechanisms, 54 ECONOMETRICA 95 (1986).
34 See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.13.2 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the purpose of
copyright); I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03(A) (2002) (same).
35 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 34. But see Congress's early characterization of copyright
as tax, as it appeared in Lord Macaulay's statement that copyright is a "tax on readers for
the purpose of giving a bounty to writers." 8 THOMAS MACAULAY, THE WORKS OF LORD
MACAULAY 195, 201 (Lady Trevelyan ed. 1875). For modern day references to this
particular controversy, see, for example, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of
Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (1945); and Hunter & Lastowka, supra note
12, at 953-54.
36 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 69 (2003).
2007-2008
8
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/2
COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE
positive effects of copyright's encouragement of creativity by protection
against copying balances outweigh the negative effects of discouraging
creation by raising the initial cost of creation through restrictions on the
use of existing copyrighted sources.
37
The second definition of efficiency originates from Harold
Demsetz's signaling effects theory.38 Demsetz argues that the copyright
(and patent) systems play the important role of optimizing patterns of
productivity by letting potential producers of intellectual products know
what consumers want and thus channeling productive efforts in directions
most likely to enhance consumer welfare.39 Demsetz's work suggests that
copyright law, viewed as a set of clearly defined legal proprietary
entitlements, lowers the transaction costs of agreements between copyright
holders and end-users and thus increases efficiency.
The final and least relevant of the three definitions of efficiency is
related to the second. Its objective is to eliminate or reduce the tendency of
intellectual-property rights, with an emphasis on patent rights, to foster
duplicative or uncoordinated inventive activity. 40 Presently, as Samuel
Oddi points out, there is currently no general economic theory that
integrates the three takes.41 Until that challenge is successfully met, the
power of the utilitarian approach to provide guidance to lawmakers will be
sharply limited.42 Nonetheless, courts have traditionally adopted the
incentive theory approach within copyright jurisprudence. 43
Thus, the economic rationale of copyright jurisprudence largely
ignores independent distributive justice questions and instead focuses on
37 Id.
38 Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. I
(1969). In the past decade, theorists have argued that recognition of this function justifies
expanding the copyright and patent systems. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S
HIGHWAY 178-79 (1994).
39 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38.
40 See Partha Dasgupta, Patents, Priority and Imitation or, The Economics of Races and
Waiting Games, 98 ECON. J. 66, 74-78 (1988); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz,
Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the Speed of R&D, I I BELL J. ECON. 1, 12-13
(1980); Mark F. Grady & J.1. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REV. 305 (1992).
41 See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 270 (1996).
42 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1661, 1698-1744 (1988); Glunn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996).
43 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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incentivizing the end-results of creativity, namely, works of art.44 Some
scholars have reached this conclusion by arguing that intellectual property,
like real property, is necessary because of prospecting. 45 As does real
property, copyright law upholds a set of legal rights that determines what
can or cannot be done with a given entitled resource, as opposed to
protecting the liberal democratic process of the employment of that
resource.
46
Copyright scholars, until recently, have not attempted to link
copyright policy to the broader theory of distributive justice. 47 Thus, the
prevailing philosophy of the Copyright Clause 48 is that encouraging
individual effort through the possibility of personal gain is the most
effective way to advance public welfare. Courts have traditionally held
that when technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous,
the Copyright Act must be construed in light of its constitutional
incentives, 49 in reference to three main interpretative rules: consideration
of the common sense of the statute,50 its purpose,5' and the practical
consequences of suggested interpretations.5
2
44 See, e.g., Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156; Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 291-321 (1970); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV.
409, 428 (2002).
41 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 267-69 (1977).
46 [d.
47 Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 104 (2004).
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.; 17 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417
(1984); Alameda Films SA De CV v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp. Inc., 331 F.3d
472, 482 (5th Cir. 2003); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99
F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 1996); Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE., Ltd., 61
F.3d 696, 707 (9th Cir. 1995); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527
(9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992);
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Sys., Inc., 77 F.2d 393, 398 (8th Cir.
1985); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1167
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
50 See Hubbard Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 399; see also, 18 C.J.S. Copyrights § 4 (2007).
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This Article argues that, subject to narrow exceptions, copyright law
should not promote distributive justice concerns, and that other, more
efficient, means of redistribution, such as taxation and welfare, should
address them. It does so in accordance to the prevailing utilitarian
interpretative approach to copyright jurisprudence, with emphasis on the
latest Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing litigation. Part B examines the three
leading classes of distributive injustice: 1) enrichment of poor infringers,
2) enrichment of poor creators and 3) diminishment of the wealth of
copyright industries. Part C discusses three leading critiques of
rationalizations of distributive justice based on libertarianism, liberty and
well-being theory, along with some narrow forms of efficiency analysis
within the copyright discourse.5 3 Part D offers the strongest specific
criticism of copyright distributive justice based on welfare economics.
The argument proceeds on four fronts, examining: 1) distributive justice's
failure to promote egalitarian redistribution of proprietary legal
entitlements between parties, resulting in a disparity between litigating and
non-litigating parties; 2) distributive justice's expensive adverse effects; 3)
the inability of distributive justice to produce precise consequences; and 4)
the social costs distributive justice inefficiently imposes.
In Part E, I conclude that it is undesirable to build egalitarian
commitments into copyright doctrine because it is often impossible to
effectively redistribute income through copyright law and, even when it is
possible, redistribution through the government's tax and transfer system
is less discriminatory, cheaper and more precise.
B. CLASSES OF COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE
Three leading classes of distributive injustice are cited in the
controversy over the latest P2P file sharing litigation: 1) enrichment of
poor infringers; 2) enrichment of poor creators; and 3) diminishment of
the wealth of copyright industries.
53 Lewinsohn-Zamir and Dagan offer a fourth personality theory argument within the
context of takings doctrine. This argument, however, is less relevant to American
copyright jurisprudence that largely rejected this civil-law based personality theory.
Compare Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by
Planning Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 47, 55
(1996) with Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 787
(1999). According to the Lewinsohn-Zamir, however, copyright owners would be more
harmed when a certain work of art of theirs is unlawfully reallocated, than when a similar
value is taken from their total wealth. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra, at 55.
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1. ENRICHMENT OF POOR INFRINGERS
Appeals to the unfortunate status of targeted copyright infringers are
aimed at gaining public sympathy for the infringers. In reports on lawsuits
against alleged infringers, the infringers' financial, professional, social and
marital status, as well as age, sex and health conditions are frequently
mentioned. For example, news accounts have pointed out that among file-
sharing copyright violators are a twelve-year-old girl,54 a sixty-six-year-
old retired school teacher, 55 and a seventy-one-year-old grandfather.
5 6
Reports have also detailed alleged infringers' unfortunate health or
emotional conditions, describing some as dyslexic or distressed by the
allegations.5 7 One report noted that a single mother had to bear the
expenses of a settlement for her minor daughter's alleged infringements.5
Even a self-employed businessman was described as yet another social
victim.5 9 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an influential non-
governmental organization (NGO) that served as defense counsel in the
businessman's case, stated "[iut's not fair to hold people like Mr. Plank
[the alleged infringer] as collateral damage in the RIAA dragnet."6 The
EFF's rhetoric demonstrates the use of distributive injustice arguments to
sway public opinion to the side of poor (alleged) infringers in the media.
Another typical example of an attempt to use distributive justice
rhetoric as a tool to sway opinion to favor alleged poor infringers is
54 See Downloading Girl Escapes Lawsuit, CBSNEWS.COM (Sept. 9, 2003),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/tech/main570507.shtml; see also Jason
Schultz, File Sharing Must Be Made Legal: Suing 12-year-olds and Grandmothers Isn't
the Answer. There's Got To Be a Better Way, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept.
12, 2003), http://www.eff.org/share/20030912jason salon.php.
55 John Schwartz, She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either., N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2003, at C1.
56 Schultz, supra note 54.
51 See Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit Mistaken Identity Raises
Questions on Legal Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2003, at C1.
58 Downloading Girl Escapes Lawsuit, supra note 54.
59 See Complaint at 2-3, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Ross Plank, (No. CV03-6371 DT (FMOx))
(complaint filed by Fonovisa, BMG Music and Warner Bros. Records, Inc. alleging that
Ross Plank had used, and continued to use, an online media distribution system to
download, distribute, and/or make available copyrighted material(s) to others for
distribution); see also Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier
Foundation Defends Alleged Filesharer (Oct. 14, 2003) available at
http://www.eff org/IP/P2P/20031014_eff pr.php.
60 Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 60 (quoting Wendy Seltzer,
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observable in Lava v. Amurao.6 1  In Lava v. Amurao, the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) sued Amurao for copyright
infringement. Alleged infringer Amurao counterclaimed against the
record company for copyright misuse and sought a declaratory judgment
of non-infringement. The (RIAA) moved to dismiss Amurao's
counterclaims. The EFF filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the
opposition papers filed by Amurao. The EFF asserted that
this lawsuit is but one skirmish in the broader war the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") is
waging against unauthorized Internet copying. Using
questionable methods and suspect evidence, the RIAA has
targeted thousands of ordinary people around the country,
including grandmothers, grandfathers, single mothers and
teenagers. 62
While the rhetoric in the news and in litigation may be powerful,
there is no empirical proof that copyright law has produced distributional
inequity. There is also little validity to the claim that transferring
proprietary legal entitlements to accused infringers or poor creators by
permitting them to copy files is most efficiently done through a more
distributive justice-sensitive copyright regime.
2. ENRICHMENT OF POOR CREATORS
Poorly-financed creators serve as a second class of individuals who
copyright fairness advocates argue suffer from a heavy burden under
existing copyright law. 63 An example of the burden copyright law places
on creators is the effect of copyright law on music sampling. As described
in the Napster case,64 music sampling occurs when a user downloads one
6' Lava Records LLC, v. Amurau, No. 7:07-cv-00321-CLB (S.D.N.Y.) (filed Apr. 10,
2007).
62 Amicus Brief in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaims, Lava Records LLC, v. Amurau, No. 7:07-cv-00321-CLB (S.D.N.Y.)
(filed Apr. 10, 2007) (S.D.N.Y.) available at
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewiLRPDF.asp?filename-lava-amurao 070410brief (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007).
63 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U L. REV. 1, 6-13 (2004);
Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the
IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817 (2003); see also A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912-17 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (summarizing defenses
emphasizing use of Napster technology for "sampling" music files).
64 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896.
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of the copyright holder's works to decide whether to purchase the audio
65CD. Copyright fairness advocates argue that sampling is a beneficial use
of technology and that allowing open use of P2P networks would enrich
creators by increasing their fan base.
Court findings, however, show that the use of the Napster service to
sample new artists, based on what Napster called the "New Artists
Program," was not central to Napster's business strategy, and did not
occur with great frequency. 66 Of 1150 music files on the Napster site,
only eleven were by new artists. 67 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a
precedent-setting decision that sampling cannot constitute a fair use
because sampling is commercial in nature. 68 It refused to reinterpret the
existing law according to equitable principles, holding that increased sales
of copyrighted material attributable to unlawful use ought not to divest the
copyright holder of the right to license the material. 69 The Napster court's
assertion that digital sampling is commercial has two main ramifications.
Firstly, sampling should not be perceived as a noninfringing de
minimis or fair use. Secondly, given the fact that much content was
created and licensed prior to the advent of multimedia technology, it is
inaccurate to assume that licensees have the right to sublicense multimedia
uses. 7 1 This problem has been exacerbated by the reluctance of many
65 Id. at 1018.
66 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1009483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26,
2000) (transcript of proceedings); see also an email indicating that defendant planned to
solicit interest among unsigned artists, containing a cryptic statement regarding the
creation of indexes listing available MP3s: "For now, we should do this for UNSIGNED
artists only so the RIAA thinks we are not infringing on copyright." Parker Dec., Exh. B;
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904 n.8. An early version of the Napster website advertised
the ease with which users could find their favorite popular music without "wading
through page after page of unknown artists." I Frackman Dec., Exh. C (Parker Dep.) at
104:16-105:10, Exh. 235.
67 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
6' A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001).
69 [d.
70 See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791,
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (declining to hold, as matter of law, that defendant's digital sampling of
words "Hugga-Hugga" and "Brr" from plaintiffs song constituted noninfringing copying
of noncopyrightable material); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812,
1817-19 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on grounds
that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the sounds and phrases "ooh,"
"moves," and "free your body" were significant to song from which they were digitally
sampled). But see 1 NIMMER, supra note 34, § 2.01 [B], at 2-17 to 2-18 (upholding that
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content owners to issue blanket licenses for transformative uses of their
works. Also, it is manifested by the tendency of numerous would-be-
licensees to insist on full per copy royalties even when the multimedia
work incorporates only a minor excerpt of the licensed work.72
P2P technology freely enables unknown and amateur creators to
become large-scale producers and distributors of creative work. Copyright
fairness advocates argue that distributive justice should be a relevant
consideration when considering whether amateur creators are liable for
infringement. 73  Before the information age, however, publishing
technologies were expensive. 74 That meant the vast majority of publishing
was commercial, and large commercial entities had little trouble bearing
the costs associated with copyright law.75 While the cost of the publishing
technologies has been greatly reduced, the current system still requires
amateur creators who wish to incorporate existing copyrighted works into
their creations to bear the costs associated with finding the rights holder,
negotiating for a license, and making royalty payments. Amateurs are
generally not willing or able to bear these costs, and amateur creativity is
sometimes lost as a consequence. 76 But these costs must be set against the
benefits of the internet to amateur creators. In the internet network
environment, the amateur enjoys state-of-the-art technology that has
reduced the costs and improved the effectiveness of information
dissemination. Because of the internet, amateurs can become large-scale
producers and distributors of their creative work over. Consequently,
there seems to be no justification for providing legal support for poorly-
financed amateurs or new artists per se based on copyright-tailored
distributive justice claims concerning free access to copyrighted materials.
Furthermore, the Copyright Act's "primary objective is to encourage
the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the
71 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Domestic and International Copyright Issues Implicated in the
Compilation of a Multimedia Product, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1397, 1409-11 (1995).
72 See Kevin J. Harrang, Licensing Issues in Creating and Publishing Multimedia
Software Products, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, DRAFTING LICENSING AGREEMENTS
289 (1995).
7, Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 12, at 988; see also Jessica Litman, Copyright
Noncompliance (or Why We Can't 'Just Say Yes' to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 237, 251 (1996); Von Houweling, supra note 12, at 33; Rebecca Tushnet, Legal
Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651,
651 (1997).
74 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 85-94 (2004), available at
http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 95-97; see also Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 12, at 958.
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public good.",77 Any understanding of fairness claiming that the promotion
of the public good per se best serves the Copyright Act's policy expresses
a one-sided view of the Copyright Act's purposes. In fact, the rights of the
secondary creator for free access to copyrighted materials must be
balanced against the rights of the primary creator; the social benefits of
secondary creation are traded against diminished incentives for primary
creation. In Wheaton v. Peters,78 a case involving a challenge to a
secondary work as violating an alleged common law copyright, the
Supreme Court made it clear that copyright is strictly a creature of statute
and is neither a common law property right nor a natural right of the
author.79 Wheaton's description of copyright protection as a monopoly in
derogation of the rights of the public has become a basic premise of
subsequent copyright legislation and court decisions. In fact, since
Wheaton, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the standard that "[t]he
copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration." 80 The Court has made it clear that it is peculiarly important
that the law's boundaries be demarcated as clearly as possible.8 It is
hardly consistent with the purpose or judicial interpretations of the nature
of copyright law to adapt it to better facilitate the particular benefits that
amateur content protection promotes.
3. DIMINISHMENT OF THE WEALTH OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
Copyright fairness scholars often argue against the concentration of
media ownership, suggesting that it will lead to disparities in the power
balance between wealthy speakers and their audiences. 82 Concentrations
77 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 518 (1994).
7'33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
79 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 362 (1908); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) ("Copyright property under the Federal law is wholly
statutory and depends upon the right created under acts of Congress."); American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907) ("In this country it is well
settled that property in copyright is the creation of the Federal statute."); Holmes v.
Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 85-86 (1899); Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889);
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 252 (1888).
80 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
81 See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 517-518.
82 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of
Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879, 1884 (2000); Hunter & Lastowka, supra note
12, at 1017-1018; William Gibson, Address to Directors Guild of America on "Digital
Day," (May 17, 2003), available at
http://www.williamgibsonbooks.com/archive/2003 05 01 archive.asp#200322370. But
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of power are said to determine the mix of speech that comprises public
discourse. 83 The media has also largely supported the view that the
copyright industries are monopolistic. 84 Anthony Prapkanis, a University
of California-Santa Cruz professor of social psychology, sums up this
view, with his comment that, while the American public may be
sympathetic to the music industry's plight, "the image is out there of the
bully ganging up on people with the least amount of money, the rich
taking from the poor."5 Napster unsurprisingly used the same antitrust-
like terminology, asserting that RIAA members had expanded their
monopoly beyond the permissible scope under the law.
86
Despite the concerns of scholars and the arguments of infringers, the
extent to which monopoly power is present in any particular case is an
empirical question. 87 However, at no point has the record industry been
found to be monopolistic within its meaning in the United States' antitrust
laws.
The overriding economic goal of the antitrust laws is to maximize
consumer welfare through the efficient allocation of resources.88
Accommodating non-economic goals into the analysis generally confuses
antitrust jurisprudence and subverts its basic purposes.89 The use of
antitrust law is meant to enhance market efficiency, not to redistribute
proprietary legal entitlements, and therefore using antitrust-style
arguments to support copyright fairness is somewhat contradictory.
see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1933 (2000).
83 Netanel, supra note 82, at 1884; Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 12, at 1017.
84 Sam Diaz, Recording Industry in a Bind, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at
1E ("And suddenly, the trade association [RIAA]-in its effort to squelch illegal music
sharing over peer-to-peer networks such as Kazaa and Grokster looked more like a
schoolyard bully."); Jefferson Graham, RIAA Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos, USA
TODAY, Sept. 10, 2003, at 4D.
" Graham, supra note 84 ("'Are they taking a PR hit?' asks Lee Kovel, of L.A.-based
Kovel/Fuller ad agency. 'Of course. Massive. I think they asked, 'What's the pain vs. the
reward?' They want to make a statement and strike fear. They don't care about PR."').
See generally http://www.boycott-riaa.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (discussing the
views of those opposed to the RIAA and its copyright protection actions).
16 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
87 See Kitch, supra note 45.
88 1 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103, 111-13 (1978); Richard
A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 933-34
(1979).
89 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 88, at 104.
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Furthermore, imposition of redistributive methods through copyright
law would require perfectly balancing efficient market reconstruction
against the harm caused by anti-competitive practices-practices which
were not severe enough to lead courts to formally proclaim the record
industry unlawfully monopolistic. Any adjustment to copyright law due to
parties' anti-competitive practices must be premised on a failure to apply
antitrust laws. Beyond these considerations, the balance between incentive
and restriction for what is overinclusively referred to as the "copyright
industry" should not be considered evenly. Instead, any particular book,
movie, or invention is likely to face competition from other books,
movies, or inventions which are near but not necessarily perfect
substitutes.
90
Copyright law neither should be designed to promote the well-being
of private parties or specific categories of people nor should it be
connected to ends that advance a sectored societal goal or the creation of
another market to explore. At times there may be a lack of understanding
among fairness scholars of what, given the present constitutional copyright
framework, distributive justice is most efficient in promoting. Any
application of distributive justice ultimately is done at the expense of a
given sector of the public and diminishes the size of the general market,
91
against the purpose of copyright law. The general history of copyright law,
and of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution in particular, clearly
reveals that copyright exists for the benefit of the public welfare. 92 Thus,
its goal should not be to advance specific sectors of society or distinct
markets.
C. DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICES: THE THREE ACCOUNTS
There are three leading critiques of distributive justice
rationalizations. These first two critiques are based on libertarianism and
liberty and well-being theory in combination with some narrow forms of
efficiency analysis within the copyright discourse. The third account of
distributive justice, which is also the focal point of this Article, originated
in the law-and-economics movement. It argues that there are sound
reasons for the copyright law not to take explicit account of distributional
90 See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 45.
91 See Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43
B.C. L. REv. 193, 225-26 (2001); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 249-54 (1997).
92 See, e.g., Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law: Hearing on H.R. 989 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Copyright Law Revision, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (Committee Print 1961) (Part 1)).
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concerns. According to the law and economics view, one can avoid the
question of fairness at the starting point simply by asserting that taxation
law or welfare laws are better designed to take care of distributive
questions of fairness or justness than copyright jurisprudence. In the
context of copyright law, beyond generic redistribution of copyright to the
needy, law should use the tax-and-transfer system to achieve distributive
fairness or justice.
1. LIBERTARIAN ARGUMENTS: BEYOND PARETO SUPERIORITY
The first of the three primary critiques of distributive justice is based
on libertarian principles. These principles argue against incorporating
distributive justice concerns into copyright law. Libertarians' opposition to
the use of private law and copyright as a mechanism for redistribution
derives from the general belief that the compulsory transfer of proprietary
legal entitlements is, to all accounts, one manifestation of theft, regardless
of how it is accomplished. 93  When a private good is stolen, the theft
necessarily deprives the original owner of possession. The question arises
whether violation of copyright is sufficiently similar to theft of property to
justify the extension of this line of argument to copyright law. The United
States Department of Justice,94 the RIAA, and the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) all unequivocally characterize the free
downloading of copyrighted material as an act of theft, arguing that those
who download music online are "stealing" intellectual property. 9 The
1997 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act,96 a recent and rather draconian
criminal copyright infringement law, also equates copyright infringement
93 See, e.g., ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149-53, 167-74 (1974); see
also Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON.
293, 293-94 (1975); James M. Buchanan, Political Equality and Private Property: The
Distributional Paradox, in MARKETS AND MORALS 69, 69-84 (G. Dworkin, G. Bennet, &
P. Brown eds., 1977). In the copyright context, see Ku, supra note 26, at 305 ("In this
case, the use of Napster is not theft-copyright is theft."); see also Margaret Jane Radin,
Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 U. PITT. J.L. & COM. 509, 512-13 (1996); John
Perry Barlow, Napster. corn and the Death of the Music Industry,
http://www.sparklehouse.com/sparklehouse/mp3/barlow.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
94 See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Remarks at the Press Conference Announcing the Intellectual
Property Rights Initiative (July 23, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/dagipini.htm.
95 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Piracy: Online and On the Street,
http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2007); Press Release,
Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., Motion Picture and Music Industries File Suit Against
Scour.com (July 20, 2000).
96 Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
506, 507; 18 U.S.C. § 2319, 2319A, 2320; 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000)).
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with theft of physical property. 97 According to industry groups and the
NET Act, anything less than a complete preservation of copyright
constitutes theft and is unjustifiable, even though making an unauthorized
copy does not actually deprive the owner of the copyright of possession of
their work, given the nonrivalrous nature of digital music.
98
The rationalization of distributive justice from a libertarian point of
view may be found within the conceptual difficulty fairness scholars
should have in dealing with Pareto-superiority. If a system is not Pareto-
efficient, there is value to be had in advancing a different approach; if a
system is Pareto-efficient, no additional value can be gained by changing
approaches. 99 Unless a legal rule is Pareto-superior to all other feasible
rules, in the sense that no one would object to the adoption of that rule, an
advocate for the rule must present a normative argument for why that rule
should be adopted, given that it causes one group to be made better off at
the expense of another.' 00 In other words, one policy is said to be "Pareto
superior" to another if it makes at least one person better off without
making anyone else worse off; a policy is said to be "Pareto optimal" if
there exist no Pareto superior policies. The Pareto principles are quite
useful in basic market situations. For example, where two agents have
explicitly agreed to an exchange, according to the Pareto principles it
seems entirely reasonable to infer that the exchange was mutually
beneficial. With what seems like only a minor philosophical concession,
the Pareto principles can also be used to legitimate those exchanges (and
legal rules) that everyone would have agreed to, had their consents been
solicited. If a legal rule leaves everyone better off, the rule should be
implemented; if not, it should be abandoned. To the libertarian, thus, there
is no compelling normative rationale to use copyright law to enact a
proprietary legal entitlement transfer.
One might argue, in contrast, that copyright law itself accomplishes
that transfer while bearing little relation to the preservation of private
property. Because a public good such as a broadcast television program is
nonrivalrous, any number of individuals can copy an existing broadcast
97 Id; see also discussion infra Part B.3.
98 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33 (1984);
United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 243 (5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that taping a
copyrighted broadcast "does not implicate a tangible item ... nothing was removed from
someone's possession"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony
Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 979 (2002).
99 Whenever a resource distribution is Pareto optimal, no other allocation of resources
would benefit at least one person without imposing a cost on someone else. See RICHARD
LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 284-85, 298, 388-89 (5th
ed. 1973).
100 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xiii (1975).
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without depriving some other person of access.'10 If someone shoplifted a
CD of the latest music group, that would constitute theft of a tangible,
private good and would be punishable under applicable state laws. Such
conduct would not comprise copyright infringement, however, and under
applicable state laws the theft of a CD would in all probability be valued at
the market price for the CD, not at the worth of the intangible rights to
reproduction that copyright protects. 102 But it is not the role of copyright
law to make a normative choice concerning the scope of distribution
created by copyright law whenever Pareto superiority is present. That does
not mean that distribution is inefficient or that it is bad law -just that
copyright is not the proper set of laws to promote distributive justice. 103
Another argument against the libertarian critique of distributive
justice in copyright law is based on American public opinion in favor of a
file sharing norm. 104 With members of the general public and the
recording community are upset with the RIAA's pursuit of copyright
violators, it seems that the public views downloading as morally
legitimate.' 05 While the recording industry perceives music downloading
as illegal, "[s]ome do not even seem to see any real moral, ethical, or even
legal dilemma with media piracy over the Internet." 10 6 Moreover, through
recognition of the potential of new technologies to facilitate inexpensive
speech, courts have been partly promoting copyright distributive justice
arguments even indirectly. Judicial sympathy for poorly-financed speakers
can be found in Reno v. ACLU, in which the court noted "[The internet]
provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all
kinds. . . . Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
101 BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 250-81 (1992).
102 Id.
103 See discussion infra Part B.3.
104 See Stacey M. Lantagne, The Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the Recording
Industry's Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269 (2004).
105 See Amanda Lenhart & Susannah Fox, Downloading Free Music: Internet Music
Lovers Don't Think it's Stealing 2 (Sept. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP Online Music Report2.pdf (observing that
approximately 80% of music downloaders do not consider what they are doing to be a
form of stealing).
106 Oversight Hearing on 'Peer-To-Peer Privacy on University Campuses': Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 110th Cong.
(2003) (statement of John Hale, Assistant Professor of Computer Science, University of
Tulsa); see also, e.g., Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Tone Deaf to a Moral Dilemma? Millions
Download Songs Illegally But Don't Feel Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at Al.
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newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer." °10 7 And yet,
copyright jurisprudence was not designed to overcome Pareto-superiority
through compulsory transfer of proprietary legal entitlements, regardless
of how the transfer is accomplished. Copyright law is inefficient in
promoting distributive justice by favoring the poor and penalizing the
wealthy within the copyright regime.
2. WELL-BEING THEORY: BEYOND BASIC NEEDS
A second account of distributive justice comes from the liberal
approach, which balances protection of individual property with
government support for basic needs. Beyond some narrow exceptions
already protected by statute, the preservation of basic needs cannot justify
the use of copyright law to advance principles of distributive justice.
The liberal approach holds that fundamental property rights,
established by principles of acquisition and transfer, should be inviolate. 1
08
But inequalities in such basic goods as health, nutrition, shelter and
education cannot be justified by efficiency and should be justifiably
distributed. 10 9 Inequalities in basic goods cannot be justified by
maximizing total social wealth, and filling the basic needs of individuals is
the responsibility of the government, to be achieved via its tax and transfer
mechanisms."10 Along with concerns about inequality as a moral problem,
welfare as a preservation of basic needs has also been characterized as a
107 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see generally, Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It
Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
108 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 93-102, 133-61 (1961); see
also Buchanan, supra note 93, at 69-84; Epstein, supra note 93, at 293-94.
109 See DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 224, 272
(1989); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 8, 299-300 (1986). As Daphna Lewinson-Zamir concludes in a seminal
paper, the need to protect property is most necessary with regard to autonomy and liberty.
Lewinson-Zamir, supra note 21, at 1715. But see id. at 1716 (applying the objective well-
being theory to property law, based on the Maslowian Pyramid of needs, expanding the
scope of protection also to "the acquisition of knowledge necessary for appreciating the
good things in life", "adopting worthwhile goals", or "realizing one's potential"). See
also ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 35-58, 97-98 (2d ed. 1970).
110 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 87-88, 90-95, 274-70 (1971); Grey, supra note
11, 890 n.38 (1976) John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 159, 159 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); John Rawls, The
Basic Structure as Subject, in VALUES AND MORALS 47, 54-55 (Alvin Golman &
Jaegwon Kim eds., 1978) [hereinafter Rawls, Basic Structure]; see also CHARLES FRIED,
RIGHT AND WRONG 143-50 (1978).
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means to curtail violence by welfare recipients. II For my purposes,
depending on the breadth of "basic needs," the characterization might
trump the inviolate nature of property in copyright and might authorize the
use of copyright law for redistributive ends.
But individuals utilizing their private property are not required to
treat others with care or concern. 112 This "division of labor" promotes
distributive justice without unduly undermining individual liberty. 113
Well-being theories of fairness argue for compulsory redistribution of only
"primary goods," 114 but the vast majority of copyrighted digital works
would not fall into the category of "primary goods." Such less-than-basic
needs do not justify government intervention or the adoption of a new
interpretative paradigm for digital copyright law. Liberal democratic
societies should be able to agree that the economic status of internet users
downloading digital music does not correspond with the basic needs that
well being theories initially are said to augment.
Concern for ideals of distributive justice in our current legal regime
has for the most part been confined to those fields of law that are
specifically designed for fostering these ideals, such as tax law and
welfare law. These concerns have been extended to copyright law in a
very limited manner. The Copyright Act of 1976 includes a variety of
narrowly chosen exceptions designed to help certain parties including the
blind, handicapped, and disabled persons; 115 nonprofit educational
institutions;" l6 religious organizations;" l7 and other nonprofit groups, such
111 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 306-08, 314-24, 315-16 (1985); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993) 1-10 (adding
that U.S. welfare policies expand during times of civil instability so as to pacify social
unrest).
112 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 8 (1986).
113 Id. at 299-301.
114 Even Ghosh at one point admits, somewhat confusingly, that "distributive justice
supports social arrangements that aid and distribute resources to those who are excluded
from democratic and market arrangements." Ghosh, supra note 1, at 859. Such an
argument, however, does not often apply to illegal music downloading.
1' See 17 U.S.C. § 110(8)-(9) (2006) (excusing certain performances specifically
designed for and directed to blind or other handicapped persons); id. § 121 (excusing
certain reproductions or distributions of nondramatic literary works for use by blind or
other disabled persons).
116 See id. §110(1) (excusing certain performances or displays by nonprofit educational
institutions); see also id. § 107(1) (referring to "nonprofit educational purposes" in
defining the scope of the fair use defense); id. § 108 (excusing certain reproductions by
libraries or archives).
l1 See id. § 110(3) (excusing certain performances or displays "in the course of services
at a place of worship or other religious assembly").
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as "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization[s]," "nonprofit
veterans' organization[s]," or 'nonprofit fraternal organization[s]." 118 The
Copyright Act also includes a provision that permits live performance of
musical works and non-dramatic literary works, as long as the
performance does not have a commercial purpose, the performers are not
paid, and no admission fee is charged. 119 In these narrow categories
copyright law indeed resembles exceptions favored by income tax
legislation. 120 The latter provision, for example, was designed to benefit
predominantly poor creators who could not otherwise afford to perform
copyrighted works. 121
Copyright law must include such narrowly defined components of
distributive justice if the law of copyright is to have the necessary degree
of minimum moral acceptability and to meet the liberal approach's
preservation of basic needs. The scholarly debate over the role of
distributive justice in copyright law should begin where these narrowly
chosen generic exemptions end. 122 Patent law jurisprudence tells a similar
tale of distributive justice. 123 The market for pharmaceutical products sets
the proper analogy-in the pharmaceutical products realm, the availability
of intellectual property is often "an issue of life and death, not merely of
dollars and cents."' 124 Accordingly, the main critique of the pharmaceutical
11 See id. § 110(6) (excusing certain performances by nonprofit agricultural groups); id.
§ 110(10) (excusing certain performances by nonprofit veterans' or fraternal
organizations).
119 Id. § 110(4). If there is an admission charge, such performances are still permitted so
long as the proceeds above costs are only used for educational, religious, or charitable
purposes, and so long as the copyright holder does not object via procedures specified in
the statute. Id. § I10(4)(B).
120 See 26 U.S.C. § 22 (2006) (U.S. Income Tax Code provides tax credits for
permanently and totally disabled persons); Id. § 501-539 (providing tax exemptions for
certain organizations).
121 The exception was broader under the 1909 Copyright Act, which exempted all
performances that were not for profit. 35 Stat. 1075 (1906) (codified as amended in 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-801). A 1976 House Report explains that the old exemption was too
broad because "[m]any 'non-profit' organizations are highly subsidized and capable of
paying royalties." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976). Presumably, then, the narrow
exemption is intended to allow performances by poorly-financed groups that would be
unable to afford the fees required to perform the works of their choice.
122 See id. at 70.
123 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1, 68
(2002); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
173.
124 Abramowicz, supra note 47, at 105.
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patents regime is that poor "patients cannot afford pharmaceuticals that
have already been developed and could be produced at low marginal
cost."' 125 But within the context of copyright, outside the narrow scope of
the aforementioned exceptions, entry barriers on access to copyright are
small, as most copyrighted works can be purchased at low prices and are
subject to mass consumption. 126 It is therefore not as essential to preserve
a general right to access a broad swath of copyrighted material regardless
of one's ability to pay.
Acknowledging the existence of some "basic needs," the necessity of
a minimum threshold of property to well-being creates a quantity
requirement: A certain amount of property is necessary for people to be
able to fare even modestly well. But when subject to carefully tailored
exceptions, copyright law only deals with goods that fall above this
threshold, and thus does not need to be manipulated to alleviate
distributive justice concerns. Whatever the legitimate role of rules
ensuring people a minimal amount of property in order to achieve an
increased basic well-being, copyright law should not be interpreted in that
rather fashionable manner, or at least mannered in that fashion.
3. WELFARE ECONOMICS: BEYOND KALDOR-HICKSIAN APTITUDE
A third account of distributive justice originated in the law-and-
economics movement. This approach is the focal point of this Article.
According to this approach, there are sound reasons for the law not to take
explicit account of the distributional concerns. 127 One can avoid the
question of the fairness of the starting point simply by asserting that
taxation law or welfare laws are better designed to take care of distributive
questions of fairness or justness than copyright jurisprudence.128 As I have
stressed, this is an argument about the most effective way to accomplish
distributive objectives and not the normative importance of distributive
concerns. 129 It is widely agreed in the law and economics literature that
125 Id.
126 For further critique, see discussion infra Part D.2.
127 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-
27 (2d ed. 1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994);
Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking:
Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON.
REv. 414 (1981).
128 But see, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413 (1992) (using law and economics analysis while implicitly assuming that taxes
are not available for redistributive purposes).
129 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 995.
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redistributive goals can be accomplished better through tax law 130 than
through the reshuffling of property rights. 13 1 Cost-benefit analysis aimed
at maximizing welfare, therefore, does not mitigate against distributive
goals.132 Rather, in compliance with the prevailing economic paradigm,
copyright should avoid promoting distributive means.133
Welfare economics is not concerned with distribution in this
situational sense. 134 Changing how a loss is divided between the two
parties, hence, is of no consequence under welfare economics. 135 To be
sure, the issue of the appropriate criterion of well-being of users of
copyrighted works and their creators alike, used in evaluating welfare and
in welfare maximization, is distinct from the "fairness" paradigm largely
advocated by copyright fairness scholars, which concerns the appropriate
distribution of well-being-be it measured by subjective1 36 or objective' 37
130 The U.S. tax system redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the federal government.
See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1564 (2006) (income taxes); id. §§ 2001-
2704 (estate and gift taxes); id. §§ 4001-5000 (miscellaneous excise taxes); id. §§ 5001-
5881 (alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.0-1 to 801.6
(2003) (Treasury regulations concerning Internal Revenue Code). Many economists
writing in the field of public economics study the distributive effects of taxation and other
government policy. See, e.g., TUOMALA, supra note 30; VICKREY, supra note 30;
Mirrlees, supra note 30.
131 See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF ch. 4
(1975); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977).
132 See Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in BLACKWELL'S
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311, 330 (Dennis Patterson ed.
1996); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 594 (1985). There are a number of explanations for
the common belief that income distribution is unimportant in normative economic
analysis of law. For further discussion, see infra Part D. 1.
133 To clarify, the term "distribution" herein refers to concerns about the "overall
allocation of income or wealth"-that is, about economic equality and inequality.
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 998. However, concerns regarding who is supposed
to overcome in a particular legal dispute are also often described as distributive. In such
contexts, the word "distributive" refers to the allocation of a particular loss linking the
disputing parties (rather than to the degree of disproportion in the allotment of earnings in
the general public), and the apposite distribution is understood to be determined by
notions of fairness such as corrective justice (instead of by a conception of the
appropriate allotment of earnings in the general public). Id.
134 Indirectly, however, changing the division of losses between parties to disputes may
often affect individuals' well-being in a number of respects. See id.
135 See id.
136 See BRINK, supra note 109, at 217; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 1350.
137 See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 23-24, 37-44, 55-60 (1993); Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 19, at 980 n.35, 1353-54.
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standards-among individuals. In other words, the economic notion of
fairness is one that is concerned unequivocally with the distribution of
legal entitlements (and at times even income). By incorporating fairness,
then, welfare economics accommodates all factors that are relevant to
individuals' well-being and to its distribution.
138
In economic terms, as Jehle provided, if appropriate conditions hold,
"[a]ny Pareto optimal allocation can be supported by competitive markets
and some distribution of initial endowments."' 139 To be sure, welfare
economics does not support the Kaldor-Hicks framework. 140 Because
welfare economics incorporates consideration of the distribution of
income, the well-known opposition regarding the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
test is inapplicable to welfare economics. 14 1 Under a common
understanding of this normative paradigm, copyrights are assessed by
reference to wealth maximization or efficiency, criteria that many take to
omit important characteristics of individuals' well-being and other
distributive concerns.142
138 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 968. On welfare economics, see generally
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); JOHN C.
HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL
SITUATIONS ch. 4 (1977). For reference on applied welfare economics, see ROBIN W.
BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS (1984); I.M.D. LITTLE & J.A.
MIRRLEES, PROJECT APPRAISAL AND PLANNING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1974);
and DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE ch.
19 (1989).
139 GEOFFREY A. JEHLE, ADVANCED MICROECONOMIC THEORY 232 (1991). For seminal
work on welfare economics, see ARROW, supra note 138; and HARSANYI, supra note 138.
On applied welfare economics, see BROADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 138; YEW-KWANG
NG, EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: WITH A CASE FOR HIGHER PUBLIC
SPENDING (2000); and YEW-KWANG NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS: INTRODUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC CONCEPTS (1979).
140 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is also called "potential Pareto optimality" because it assumes
that a move that is Kaldor-Hicks superior can be transformed into a Pareto superior move
by forcing the gainers from the move to compensate the losers. See Nicholas Kaldor,
Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON.
J. 549, 549-50 (1939). For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a tool of legal
policymaking, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 68
CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980); Lewis A. Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of
Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 594, 634-39 (1980).
141 See Hanson & Hart, supra note 132, at 330 (observing that "[p]erhaps the most
common criticism of law and economics is that it overlooks or, worse, displaces
questions of distribution or equity" and asserting that "[e]conomists respond in part by
observing that distributional questions taken by themselves fall outside the reach of
economic science"); Tribe, supra note 132, at 594 ("This disregard of the distributional
dimension of any given problem is characteristic of the entire law-and-economics school
of thought.").
142 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 968.
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A welfare economics understanding of copyright entitlements will
ultimately relieve the tension between market-driven economies and the
assorted arguments for intervening with market outcomes on the basis of
fairness. 143 In conclusion, it may be inefficient to choose an inappropriate
policy in order to promote the desired distribution of individual welfare.
Copyright that is not specifically designed for redistribution should
therefore avoid distributive ends.
D. RATIONALES AGAINST COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
1. DISTRIBUTION DISCRIMINATES
The income tax and welfare system can redistribute relatively easily
from the rich to the poor, while copyright law has substantially less
redistributive potential. Any particularization of copyright rules based on a
fair use liability rules analysis, where the law merely discourages
copyright infringements by requiring infringers to pay victims for the
harm they suffer ex post, 144 or even a property rules analysis, 145 based on
excludable rights on behalf of distributive justice claims, would affect
only relatively small fractions of the population. 1
46
To begin with, substantive copyright law will not be able to
redistribute the value of the proprietary rights it defends systematically
unless the status of the parties in a dispute correspond closely to the
groups between which redistribution is desired. 147 Whenever the
downloading of digital music involves internet users and song owners,
there is no obvious correlation between the commoditized information
owned by a party and whether that party is an internet user or a song
owner. Furthermore, there may be no correlation between the income of a
party and whether that party is a victim or a transgressor.
Distributional justice also falls short when applied to copyright law's
remedial corollaries, and in particular remedial damages. It may be
efficient for damages to reflect the victim's income in some categories of
143 See William D.A. Bryant, Misinterpretations of the Second Fundamental Theorem of
Welfare Economics: Barriers to Better Economic Education, 25 J. ECON. EDUC. 75, 75
(1994); see also discussion infra Part D.
144 See POLINSKY, supra note 127, at 125.
145 Property rules guarantee property right assignments through the threatened use of law
ex ante.
141 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 994.
147 Cf. POLINSKY, supra note 127, at 125.
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legal disputes, such as in tort law when an injury involves lost future
earnings. And in some contexts, whether one is an injured party or an
injuring party might serve as a proxy for income. To illustrate, in nuisance
and pollution control disputes there may be a close correlation between the
income of a party and whether that party is a victim or an injurer. 148 Thus,
in some kinds of disputes, the choice of a bright line rule favoring one of
the parties might contribute towards the implementation of distributional
goals. But this is not the case in copyright law.
In recent years, certain courts have chosen to treat a financial
disparity between the parties as a factor to be weighed in determining
whether an award should issue rather than simply the magnitude of such
an award. 149 Hence, redistribution has been accomplished by setting
damages higher when the injurer is wealthy and lower when the injurer is
poor. Again, to illustrate, in an action for trademark and copyright
infringement, unfair competition, and conspiracy, one court recited a rule
that damages are not excessive as long as they do not ruin the defendant
financially. 50 Since the amounts awarded constituted 5% and 2.5% of the
defendants' net worth, respectively, the court concluded that financial ruin
was unlikely to result from their imposition. 51
Within the scope of copyright jurisprudence such progressive
remedies, suffer, however, from two flaws: i) the long-term implications
of progressive damages; and ii) the resulting disparity between litigating
and non-litigating parties.
I. LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRESSIVE DAMAGES
It is questionable whether a progressive damage compensation
regime will have long-term egalitarian consequences. To begin with, as
Coase suggests, the compensation regime tends in practice to be reflected
in the market price of a given infringed copyrighted work itself, rather
than in the financial status of a given infringer. I1 2 Moreover, a progressive
141 Id. at 126. The consumers of the production of a quantity of polluting industry may be
mainly superior income people, while the victims living in close proximity to the
polluting factories may be primarily lower income persons.
149 See, e.g., Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2003); Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1598 (S.D.N.Y. July
21,2000).
150 Transgo, Inc. v Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986), proceeding on other grounds, 911 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.
1990) (applying California law as to damages).
151 Id.; see also Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defendant's Wealth As
Factor in Determining Propriety ofAward, 87 A.L.R.4TH 141 (1991).
152 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 170-74 (1988).
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damage compensation regime may induce the wealthy to take more care
and the poor to take less care than is efficient. 153 Within the scope of
copyright jurisprudence, it is impractical to support a rule of law that
would require that copyright infringers have knowledge concerning
subjective losses due to copyright infringement. Internet users that
download digital music should reasonably be expected to know only about
the average losses inflicted on the song owner. 154 Similarly, works of art
disseminated by amateurs or emerging artists should not be formally
connected by law to the amateur creators' relative poverty. The Copyright
Act's primary objective is to encourage the production of original literary,
artistic, and musical expression for the public good and this purpose
reaches both corporate competitors and famished artists.
A less important argument for network-affected environment, is
however, that like in the real property world, people are more severely
impaired when an unambiguous property right of theirs is taken from
them, such as when a copyright on a specific work of art is eliminated,
than when a comparable charge is taken from their total proprietary legal
entitlements. According to what Lewinsohn-Zamir refers as the
personality argument, "people are more severely hurt when a certain asset
of theirs is taken, than when a similar value is taken from their total
wealth."'155 A significant justification for why an injury to an explicit asset
transcends the financial impediment involved derives from the distinctive
function that property plays in people's lives, as a means of expressing
their personalities.I16 A copyright legal regime that would be responsive to
this effect should prefer the method of taxes and transfer payments to
other means of redistribution.
I. DISPARITIES BETWEEN LITIGANTS AND NON-LITIGANTS
The second critique of distributive remedies is that, even when there
is a close correlation between the status of the parties in a dispute and the
groups between which redistribution is desired, legal rules still might not
be able to achieve redistribution as systematically as an income tax
system. This is because redistribution through the legal system may only
occur when a dispute arises, and not all members to a given income class
will be involved in a dispute. For example, even if the output of a
153 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 127, at 669.
114 See also discussion infra Part C. 1.
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polluting industry were consumed exclusively by rich people, not every
rich person necessarily purchases this commodity and not every poor
person lives near a factory in this industry. Thus, the legal rule used to
control the pollution dispute will, at best, redistribute income from a
subset of one income class to a subset of another.' 5 7 Moreover, even then,
redistribution may be jumbled. A pro-plaintiff rule, such as one that
supports internet users, may meet redistributive justice concerns if
plaintiffs, on average, are poorer than defendants, but unless this is
unvaryingly true, the redistribution will flow in the incorrect direction in a
number of cases. The predicament can be avoided only if the correct
outcomes in copyright litigation depend linearly on parties' earnings, a
theory that no one has proposed.
It is imperative that the law's boundaries be demarcated as clearly as
possible so that unfairness through favoritism is avoided. 5 8 Courts have
promoted this view. For example, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the court
held that a defendant seeking to advance meritorious copyright defenses
should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are
encouraged to litigate meritorious infringement claims. 5 9 In conclusion, a
rule stating that copyright remedies should equal average harm would be
efficient.
2. DISTRIBUTION IS OVER-COSTLY
In a world with zero transaction costs, excludable rights in copyright
can be reshuffled as legal rules in order to pursue distributive goals
without any transaction costs. 16 In reality, transaction costs are positive,
and reshuffling excludable rights in copyright for the sake of redistribution
has significant transaction costs. 161 Distribution through regulation, either
by Congress but more feasibly by courts, is a costly activity, and its
duplication through copyright law is inefficient. Redistribution also
157 See POLINSKY, supra note 127, at 126.
158 Lewinson-Zamir, supra note 53, at 54 (for the context of takings law); William K.
Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 11 n.37
(1995) (same).
159 510 U.S. 517, 517-18 (1994). In any event, financial disparity does not provide a basis
to award attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act. See MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce
Eng'g Co., 198 F.3d 840, 842 (for the context of attorney's fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505);
see also Harrison Music Corp. v. Tesfaye, 293 F. Supp. 2d 80, 84 (D.D.C. 2003) (same);
RIAA v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (wealth irrelevant
to royalty proceeding).
160 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 111-12 (3d ed. 2000).
161 Id.
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creates inefficiencies in the activities regulated by the preliminary rules
that promote it. 162 In comparison, income tax or transfer programs tend to
involve less distortion and inefficiency than does redistribution through
the legal rules. 163 The same is true of copyright law because of (1) the
adverse effects copyright-based redistribution has on work incentives; (2)
the administrative costs of such redistribution; (3) the long run distortion
of the economy caused by redistribution; and (4) the greater restriction of
personal liberty entailed by the redistribution.
The first reason that income tax and transfer program tend to involve
less distortion and inefficiency than redistribution through legal rules is
that redistribution has adverse effects on work incentives. 164 Copyright
law redistribution would likely have these same adverse effects on the
work incentives of creators. As is manifested in the testimony of
songwriters, artists expect to be particularly handicapped by changes to
copyright law, and such changes may negate the incentives created by the
Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause-incentives that, together with
artistic passion, keep artists at work creating music and investing in that
creation, for the benefit of the public.16
5
Moreover, taxation and welfare laws are more efficient than
regulation through copyright law because of their comparatively low
administrative costs, especially the absence of litigation costs. 166 Even if
162 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 127, at 667-68.
163 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19, at 994.
164 See, e.g., Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should
Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCAND. J. ECON. 264 (1979); Yew-
Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto Social Improvements, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1033 (1984);
Shavell, supra note 127, at 414.
161 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 1 (2001); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1006, 89th
Cong. 65 (1965) (statement of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights); Brief of the
Progress and Freedom Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3-4, 6, 8,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480),
2005 WL 176438; see also Mike Stoller, Songs That Won't Be Written, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
7, 2000, at A15 (op-ed by composer of Jailhouse Rock); Declaration of Mike Stoller in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Aug. 15, 2000, at J.A. 290, 11-
13 ("Today, I fear for the seventeen-year-old songwriter looking forward to a career in
the music business .... If [Defendants] get away with their thievery, it will turn that
teenager's future livelihood into a mere hobby, and, in doing so, it will ensure that fewer
and fewer talented individuals can afford to devote their efforts to expanding America's
musical heritage.").
166 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 160, at 112 ("The enforcement of legal rights
requires attorneys. A plaintiffs attorney in the United States routinely charges one third
of the judgment. In contrast, the fee paid to an accountant who prepares someone's
income tax return is a small fraction of the person's tax liability.").
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taxation were equally disruptive of individual freedom, and had equally
adverse incentive effects, tax schemes are, by their nature, easier to
administer and therefore less costly than regulatory arrangements designed
to achieve the same end.
167
The third rationale for favoring tax and transfer schemes as more
efficient is that redistribution by copyright law distorts the economy more
than progressive taxation in the long run. 168 For example, if copyright law
disfavors music owners, we should expect some rich music owners to
switch to different professions to gain valuable legal rights, such as patent
law tailor-made rights to prevent others from producing patent-protected
investion. On the other hand, tax-based redistribution prevents parties
from avoiding the redistribution by changing the source of their income. 169
Lastly, taxation and welfare laws place fewer restraints on individual
liberty. This may be understood as a claim about the frequency of
intervention required by redistribution. While taxation requires only an
intermittent intrusion into the lives of individuals, the direct regulation of
transactions requires unremitting state involvement in individual affairs.
An income tax is less deeply intrusive, even if the restrictions it imposes
apply continuously. Taxation and welfare laws appear to be less intrusive
because they only take money from people, leaving people free to arrange
their affairs in the way that best realizes other, non-pecuniary ends.
Regulation of copyright arrangements, by contrast, limits the sorts of
transactions individuals such as concerned song owners or even the
recording industry at large may arrange for themselves, thus placing
greater restraints on contractual freedom.17
0
3. DISTRIBUTION IS IMPRECISE
It is difficult in most copyright contexts to determine just how
copyright law could promote the interests of the poor. 171 Copyright law,
like other laws, should be based primarily on efficiency considerations, as
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 Id. "A fundamental principle of public finance is that taxes distort less when applied to
a broad base rather than to a narrow base. Distortion drop offs with the width of the base
because demand becomes less elastic. To illustrate, the demand for food is less elastic
than the demand for vegetables, and the demand for vegetables is less elastic than the
demand for carrots. Income, indeed, is very broad based." Id. at n.25
170 Rawls implicitly endorses this view of regulation. See Rawls, Basic Structure, supra
note 110, at 65.
171 See Abramowicz, supra note 47, at 106.
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it cannot redistribute proprietary legal entitlements as systematically and
precisely as tax and welfare systems. 172 "[T]he income tax system
precisely targets inequality, whereas [copyright] law relies upon crude
averages."
173
Following Little's suggestion, 174 because individuals (including
copyright infringers) have different tastes, the wealth they generate cannot
always mean equal real incomes for both poor and rich infringers.
[S]uppose that in an initial situation the equivalence did
hold. Then certainly we can find a shift in relative prices
which will make some infringers worse off and others
better off, keeping money incomes and the general price
level constant, so that in the second situation equal money
incomes will no longer coincide with equal real incomes.
175
In other words, copyright law defends "music owners' rights." If
music owners are typically richer than infringers on average, then
changing the rule to protect "infringers' rights" would theoretically
redistribute proprietary legal entitlements towards greater equality.
However, while music owners are richer than infringers on average, some
infringers are likely richer than some music owners; therefore, changing
the rights to favor infringers over music owners will increase the disparity
between rich infringers and poor music owners. In contrast, progressive
taxation will directly restructure uneven incomes.
4. DISTRIBUTION IMPOSES INEFFICIENT SOCIAL COSTS
Reshuffling copyright legal entitlements based on distributive justice
motivations may not have the distributive effects anticipated. The wealth
effects of reshuffling excludable rights in a world with no or very little
transaction costs for the works of art themselves tend to fall upon the
network service providers and the music industry, not its users. In practice,
internet service providers, who have deep pockets, are natural targets for
172 See POLINSKY, supra note 127, at 124-27; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 127; Shavell,
supra note 118.
173 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 160, at 111.
174 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Little's Critique of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV.
923 (1951).
175 Id. at 927 (suggesting an "average man" distribution of welfare, so as to overcome the
imprecision policy recommendations based on welfare economics imply).
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copyright litigation, 176 much to their distributive justice-based
dissatisfaction. The explanation of this phenomenon is twofold. First,
suppose that both infringers and music owners rent their web access from
absentee network service providers, such as internet service providers
(ISPs). If copyright law shifts the cost of preventing infringement from
infringers to music owners, competition among ISPs may cause them to
adjust rents to offset the change in costs. Specifically, network service
providers such as file sharing software providers who provide infringers'
web access will increase the rent charged to infringers, and over-increase
usage fees for their services. In addition, the network service providers
who provide web access to music owners will undercut the rent sought
from music owners. Consequently, the reshuffling of copyright exclusion
rights will not and does not affect the distribution of wealth between
infringers and music owners, but only increases their mutual dependency
in discriminatory rent seeking policies by network service providers. In
conclusion, the network service providers who provide access to
infringing access gain, thus inflicting moral hazard on the overall
copyright proprietary legal regime, while network service providers who
provide web access to copyrighted music lose. Change, in its cost-
effective sense, in the value of web access gets "capitalized" into rent.
Consequently, the proprietary legal entitlements effects of reshuffling
copyright excludable rights in a world with no or very little transaction
costs tend to fall upon the network service providers, not its users. The
solution to such a predicament, as Coase explains, is that social
externalities deriving from "unfairly" distributed copyrighted entitlements
can and should be internalized through bargaining among the affected
parties. Consequently, the individual creator would have to appropriate the
full social benefit in order to ensure that the efficient level of creation
would occur. Again, this is true regardless of who possesses the initial
right to be compensated or the obligation to pay a fine. 77 In an
environment of low transaction costs between the engaged parties, current
efficiency-based approach should remain the law.
Moreover, copyright law may affect distribution if digital music
prices are also regulated, but the price of regulation itself may be used to
accomplish redistribution. There may be some incidental distributive
effects of copyright rules, such as when copyright industries must expend
resources to opt out of default rules that will not be suitable for them. For
example, when corporations must pay more for injuries to third parties,
176 See the testimony to Congress about the bills that became the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, set forth in The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing
on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection, 105th Cong. (1998), at 41 (statements of Members of Business Software
Alliance); and David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History the Sweet And Sour
Spots of the DMCA's Commentary, 23 CARDoZO L. REv. 909, 917-18 (2002).
177 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 (1960).
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consumer prices are often affected. 178 Thus, distributive justice arguments
have been made, remarkably enough by copyright holders. 179 Such
copyright holders, including motion picture studios, recording companies,
songwriters, music publishers and others, are more often accused of
promoting efficiency and distributive injustice at the expense of poor users
and creators. Unless the compensation regime interferes, there is the risk
that the lobbying efforts of the strong copyright industry will be much
more effective than those of the relatively weaker internet users.
180
Thus, within the recent copyright file-sharing litigation, those who
seek to extend its reach to less entitled individuals (poorer creators and
less entitled infringers) or otherwise defend copyright (the record industry)
bemoan the decline in profits that record companies have suffered 8' and
that Hollywood may face - wrongly using the same flawed redistributive
income-loss-based argument. 182 This actuality also explains the copyright
industry's motivation to block the public's access to works of authorship
widely disseminated by technologies. Such blockage permits the industry
to control the terms and conditions of access by both legislative and
market-driven means, including the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992,"' the Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1994, 1 4 and
market efforts such as encoding digital video discs with mandatory Digital
Rights Management (DRM) copy-blocking schemes.
E. CONCLUSION
Distributive justice concerns arise whenever individuals struggle
over how proprietary legal entitlements are to be divided up fairly.
178 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 127 at 675 n. 11.
179 See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 914 n.2 (2005) ("The studios
and recording companies and the songwriters and music publishers filed separate suits
against the defendants that were consolidated by the District Court.").
180 See Dagan, supra note 53, at 755.
181 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. For evidence that services like Napster
have in fact hurt the profits of record companies, see Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3
Downloads Annihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence so Far, June 2003,
http://www.utdallas.edu/-iebowit/intprop/records.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
182 See, e.g., Ronald Grover & Heather Green, The Digital Age Presents Hollywood
Heist: Will Tinseltown Let Techies Steal the Show?, BUS. WK., July 14, 2003, at 74, 76
(reporting that Hollywood executives are concerned that the movie industry may suffer
the same loss of profits suffered by the music industry).
183 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992)
(codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010).
184 Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat.
336 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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Efficiency, conversely, concerns the guiding of resources to their most
valued uses. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution concerns allocation
of resources to those who most value them, namely the authors, for the
benefit of society. The information age has not changed this underlying
rationale within copyright jurisprudence. Even while it is possible to
redistribute through copyright, the government's tax and transfer system is
cheaper and is more likely to be precise. It is therefore undesirable to
force our egalitarian commitments into copyright law, beyond those
concerns for true basic needs such as the accommodation of disability (in
which the redistribution is paradigmatically only a side effect), even if the
effect of the distribution is modest.
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